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Abstract
The study of public diplomacy often proceeds with an empirical approach, focusing on crafting
policy instruments and measuring policy efficiency. But this approach tends to render descriptive
and quantitative results. This paper contextualizes public diplomacy in theoretical terms,
institutional structure, and policy priority, and points out three common misconceptions in
comparison of U.S.-China public diplomacy. It means to draw attention to normative and
qualitative approaches that should be applied to the fledging interdisciplinary study of public
diplomacy.
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Misconceptions in Comparative Study of Public Diplomacy: A U.S.-China Case Study

Overview
China‘s fast rise in the past three decades from an isolated backwater leftist
regime to a top-tier economic and political power is an historic phenomenon.
China‘s economic success poses challenges to the status quo of the world order on
two levels.
First, it demonstrates that developing countries can bypass Western-style
economic privatization, market absolutism and democratic institutions to achieve
economic fulfillment and political independence. Inspired by the showcase of
China, Third World countries think that their survival could be bettered by cherrypicking the adaptable parts of the Western development model and availing
themselves of foreign investments and technologies without themselves becoming
Westernized. China‘s model of development, coined as ―The Beijing Consensus‖
by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, could chip away the viability of the U.S. model
prescribed in the Washington Consensus, and promote an alternative worldview
that reinforced by the U.S.-led West and commonly shared by the international
community.
Second, fueled by its growing economic and political power, China‘s
national interests have become more diversified and expanding. China has become
more assertive in territorial disputes over islands in the East and South China Seas.
It has increased its defense budget substantially in recent year to upgrade military
weaponry. China has also gone on the defensive against Western criticism on its
human rights records and authoritarianism and has insisted on the legitimacy of its
political system at the present stage of social development. China, once a follower
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of the international order during its process of integration into the world, is now
trying to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve
its interests. In addition to its mighty presence in the UN and WTO, China‘s
marching footsteps have been found in international financial institutions usually
dominated by the West. It has gained over 6% membership quotas in IMF,
becoming the third largest power in this institution. China‘s share in World Bank
has also risen to 4.42%, next to Japan and the U.S. China now has the will and
capacity to pursue its own global agenda.
Against this backdrop is a seeming decline of U.S. power. America‘s
excessive use of military force in the Middle East and increasing number of cases
of human rights abuse in secret prisons around the globe turned international
sympathy for the U.S. after 9/11 into international outrage. The global financial
crisis that broke out in 2008, with the Wall Street at the eye of the storm, dragged
down the national economy and put a huge question mark on the viability of the
U.S. development model based on deregulation, overconsumption and
hyperfinancialization. Edward Snowden‘s revelation on the U.S. National Security
Agency‘s blanket surveillance on a global scale compromises the moral height of
the U.S. as the advocator of democracy and freedom. It seems that a rebalance of
global power distribution is in process.
The point of concern about the rebalance is that the U.S. and China are
heterogeneous powers in terms of political and social institutions, ideology and
culture. This generates a vicious circle of distrust. On the one hand, the U.S.-led
West worries that China is becoming a rogue force that will overhaul the
international order; on the other hand, suspicious about U.S. strategic intention to
contain China‘s rise, China feels precarious in an adverse external environment. To
Published by SURFACE, 2014

3

Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy, Vol. 5 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 7
107

make the rebalance less disruptive, the U.S., the most powerful custodian of the
existing West-dominated world order, has to shape a rising China into a responsible
stakeholder instead of a revolutionary, and China has to demonstrate the peaceful
intention of its rise. Therefore, public diplomacy is needed to foster a common
ground of mutual respect and understanding between the two countries.
China has made enormous public diplomacy efforts to assure the U.S. and
the world of its goodwill and to make its message of peace and harmony heard and
understood. When Russia invaded Georgia‘s South-Ossetia region in 2008, Beijing
was hosting the Summer Olympics with extravagance and courtesy. When the
world economy was at the peak of the financial crisis in 2010, China hosted
Shanghai Expo, inspiring the world with technological innovation and new
investment opportunities. Since 2005, under the endorsement of the Chinese
government and in collaboration with American education institutions, 97
Confucius Institutes and 357 Confucius Classrooms have been established across
the U.S., serving as Chinese culture and language education centers.1 In terms of
international broadcasting, the Chinese government has allegedly spent $7.1 billion
to expand the overseas outlets of its media.2 Flagship state-run media, such as
China Central Television, Xinhua News Agency and China Daily all have
established state-of-the-art facilities either in New York or Washington, D.C., and
have started localizing their productions in the U.S.
The U.S. is also becoming more public diplomacy savvy in handling U.S.China relations. When President Obama visited China in 2009, he creatively held a
town hall meeting with over 400 Chinese university students. He greeted the
audience with local dialect, and advocated the universal value of freedom of
expression, religious belief, access to information and political participation. The
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol5/iss1/7
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event was live streamed online in China and reviewed positively by young Chinese.
The U.S. Embassy in China is keen to use social media to conduct public
diplomacy in China. For instance, the Embassy has kept posting Beijing air quality
data recorded by the Embassy‘s facility on Weibo – China‘s most popular social
media platform. This measure strengthened environmental protection awareness
among China‘s civil society and created popular pressure on the Chinese authorities
to upgrade its air quality monitor standard. At the same time, the U.S. Embassy also
took these opportunities to share information about the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency and Clear Air Act on Weibo to advocate U.S. environmental
policy.
This kind of checklist-like quantitative comparison can help the two
countries draw lessons from each other‘s policy practice. However, without
contextualizing public diplomacy in clearer theoretical, institutional, and policy
frameworks, this kind of comparison can also be misleading because it correlates
the quantity of public diplomacy measures with their effects, and engenders policy
contest with no clear purpose.

Theoretical Misconception
According to liberal international relations theory, the fundamental actors in
international politics are individuals and private groups who are rational and riskaverse. They communicate and take collective action to promote differentiated
interests under constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values and
variation in societal influence. States represent some subset of domestic society,
and it is on the basis of the subset‘s interests that state officials define state
preferences and act purposively in world politics. The configuration of
Published by SURFACE, 2014
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interdependent states‘ preferences determines state behavior. (Moravcsik, 1997) In
the liberalist view, international and domestic spheres are inextricably linked.
States‘ internal structures determine whether their relations are cooperative or
conflictual; more focus should be given to the precise interactions between
individuals and states. (Slaughter, 2000)
The rationale behind public diplomacy is based on the assumption that
government policy should be responsive and responsible to its citizens‘ public
opinion. Therefore, country A could shape the public opinion in country B through
direct communication and exchange with the public of country B, and hence
indirectly influence country B‘s government policy towards country A. In this
sense, by targeting societal actors to shape representation and state preference,
public diplomacy is a liberal approach to diplomacy and international relations. It
inherently embraces the ideal of interdependence, cooperation and mutual
understanding, and is non-excluding in its nature.
However, in reality, people often view public diplomacy through the lenses
of realist power politics, partly because of the popularization of the concept of ―soft
power‖ that blurs the line between liberalism and realism. According to realist
international relations theory, in international politics the only important collective
actor is state; power determines the outcomes of state interaction; state can be
treated as if their dominant preference were for power (Slaughter, 2000). It stresses
the exclusiveness of power politics and hegemon. It leads to a comparative and
competitive view on a nation‘s ability to coerce or induce another nation to perform
a course of action. Scholars and diplomats have often view public diplomacy as a
measure to craft a nation‘s soft power, and consider the persuasion and
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communication ingrained in public diplomacy as calculated measures to add up to
soft power.
This theoretical misconception leads to the misunderstanding of the
relations between soft power and public diplomacy. Joseph Nye (2008) pointed out:
The resources that produce soft power arise…from the values…a country
expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and
policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others. Public diplomacy is
an instrument that governments use to mobilize these resources to communicate
with and attract the publics of other countries. (p.94)
In other words, soft power is an organic quality of a country exuding naturally from
its history, culture, social and political institutions. Public diplomacy is an
international political communication practice that makes a country‘s soft power
more visible, audible, tangible and comprehensible. Public diplomacy ―sells‖ a
country‘s soft power as it is; it doesn‘t produce soft power.
U.S.-China public diplomacy has always been framed in a zero-sum mode.
Senator Richard G. Lugar argued that U.S. was in deficit in terms of public
diplomacy competition with China.3 Senator Dana Rohrabacher called for
establishing a reciprocal relationship between the number of visas issued to statecontrolled media workers in China and in the United States.4 In 2010, over 170
University of Chicago faculty members petitioned against the establishment of a
Confucius Center and called the center an academically and politically ambiguous
initiative sponsored by the Chinese government and a risk to the university
reputation.
Correspondingly, U.S. public diplomacy practitioners also sense hostility in
China. Former U.S. Consul General in Shanghai Beatrice Camp complained that
Published by SURFACE, 2014
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the Chinese government refused to allow the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai to
open an American presence post in Nanjing, required U.S. universities to have
Chinese partners, and restricted the number of U.S. movies that can be shown in
China. Her impression was that the Chinese government was not always
comfortable with the U.S. public diplomacy practitioners‘ efforts to speak directly
to the Chinese people, and sometimes even cancelled the U.S. public diplomacy
programs without explaining the reasons.5
It is obvious that the theoretical misconception also causes confusion of
public diplomacy and propaganda. To start a comparative study of public
diplomacy, a fine line between propaganda and public diplomacy has to be drawn.
Propaganda is a form of disinformation, which is set to produce an emotional
response from the audiences. It has destructive intention to gain ground by
defaming the adversary and whitewashing oneself. On the contrary, public
diplomacy stresses on the impartial dissemination of information, truth telling and
policy interpretation. It intends to decrease misunderstanding, stereotype and
distrust between countries through candid political and cultural communication and
exchanges between peoples. It is a win-win and constructive policy practice in
which the gain of one is not at the cost of the other.
The confusion about public diplomacy and propaganda has ideological and
political roots. For China, the biggest liability in its public diplomacy toward the
U.S. is its regime‘s nature. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rules the Chinese
government. Due to collective memory of the Cold War antagonism, for
Americans, communism is strongly correlated with foreign propaganda and
repressive domestic censorship. Although the CCP has departed from the leftist
revolutionary mindset and led the country onto a path of state capitalism, a regime
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol5/iss1/7
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that still calls itself ―communist‖ and rhetorically pursues socialist aspiration is
hard to be appreciated and trusted by the American public. Any public diplomacy
endeavor carried out by the Chinese government will be viewed as a propaganda
activity that whitewashes the Communist China and counters American values.
Although the curriculums and textbooks of the Confucius Institutes are about the
Chinese language and culture, some Americans view the Confucius Institutes with
wary eyes and regard them as CCP propaganda outlets. Despite the fact that
China‘s global push for its media is more for self-explanation than it is an anti-U.S.
campaign, the presence of the Chinese media in the U.S. – such as CCTV America
and China Daily USA – has been seen as the localization of CCP‘s propaganda
machines.
For the U.S., the biggest liability in public diplomacy towards China was a
part of an outdated legislation – the Smith-Mundt Act, which banned the domestic
circulation of publications and broadcasting for U.S. public diplomacy use. This
was tantamount to announcing that U.S. public diplomacy is an overseas-oriented
propaganda activity, from which U.S. citizens should be quarantined. This
undertone gave the Chinese government a good reason to question the intention of
U.S. public diplomacy in China. Fortunately, on July 2, 2013, the Smith-Mundt
Modernization Act became effective. It finally broke down the
compartmentalization of domestic and foreign audiences and introduced
transparency and candidness into the U.S. public diplomacy effort.

Institutional Misconception
It is widely agreed that public diplomacy is a type of government-sponsored
diplomatic activity. Since government is the major actor in public diplomacy, the
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government autonomy granted by the political institution of the country decides
how public diplomacy can be carried out.
The U.S. government is in a political institution of checks and balances. The
U.S. economy is based upon market-oriented private entrepreneurship. On the
contrary, the Chinese government has very centralized power, and state-owned
enterprises take the lion share of the country‘s economy. When the two countries‘
public diplomacy programs are paired up for competitive comparison, the result of
the comparison is misleading.
China‘s vibrant public diplomacy programs benefit from the fact that
China‘s highly centralized political institution fits the general definition that public
diplomacy is a government-sponsored effort. China is a country with strong state
and weak society. The Chinese government seldom worries about checks and
balances with regard to budget making. It can effectively mobilize astronomical
amount of money to boost certain programs that it values, such as vigorous global
expansion of Chinese media outlets and the Confucius Institutes.
However, although China seems to have formidable numbers of public
diplomacy programs, a closer check reveals that China‘s public diplomacy
resources are scattered and tangled in a complicated bureaucratic system. The
cultural exchange programs are in the charge of Ministry of Culture; the education
exchange programs are in the charge of Ministry of Education; the international
broadcasting is in the charge of Publicity Department of the Central Committee of
the CCP and the State General Administration for Radio, Film and Television;
foreign aid is in the charge of Ministry of Commerce; the internet-based
communication programs are in the charge of the Information Office of the State
Council; political affairs, diplomacy and foreign journalists stationed in China are
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol5/iss1/7
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in the charge of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is no single central authority to
fully coordinate the public diplomacy effort.
In recent years, to ramp up China‘s soft power, Chinese officials and
scholars have united in their call for making public diplomacy resources even more
concerted and integrated by the government (Wang, 2008). Take China‘s Ministry
of Foreign Affairs for example. In 2009, it upgraded the Division of Public
Diplomacy under the Information Department to the higher level and more heavily
staffed Public Diplomacy Office to coordinate and mastermind the public
diplomacy effort of the Ministry, its foreign missions and beyond. The office
strengthened training programs catering to various tiers of diplomats to make them
more public diplomacy conscious and more qualified in policy advocacy towards
foreign audiences.6 Under its initiative, the Foreign Ministry established the Public
Diplomacy Advisory Panel in 2010, mainly composed of retired senior Chinese
ambassadors. The panel‘s missions are to give public diplomacy policy advice and
to make public diplomacy campaigns by taking advantage of their diplomacy
expertise and less sensitive status as retirees.7 The Public Diplomacy Office also
established an inter-ministerial coordination mechanism in an effort to achieve
better communication between public diplomacy-related ministries in the Chinese
government.8
On the contrary, the U.S. democratic system features a strong society and
weak state. Intricate legislations put the government budget under rigid scrutiny of
the Congress. For example, the Smith-Mundt Act, also called the Information and
Educational Exchange Act of 1948, strictly regulated government public diplomacy
activities. It cautiously allocates public financial resources, and puts public
diplomacy under the supervision of the Congress. Sec 401 mandated:
Published by SURFACE, 2014
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Whenever the Secretary shall use the services, facilities, or personnel of any
Government agency for activities under authority of this Act, the Secretary shall
pay for such performance out of funds available to the Secretary under this Act,
either in advance, by reimbursement, or direct transfer. The Secretary shall
include in each report submitted to the Congress a statement of the services,
facilities, and personnel of other Government agencies utilized in carrying on
activities under the authority of this Act, showing the names and salaries of the
personnel utilize, or performing services utilized, during the period covered by
such report, and the amounts aid to such other agencies under this section as
payment for such performance.
The Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 also limited the
proliferation of government-sponsored public diplomacy programs by giving
preference to private-owned entities, as Sec 502 mandated:
In authorizing international information activities under this Act, it is the sense
of the Congress (1) that the Secretary shall reduce such Government
information activities whenever corresponding private information
dissemination is found to be adequate; (2) that nothing in this Act shall be
construed to give the Department a monopoly in the production or sponsorship
on the air of short-wave broadcasting programs, or a monopoly many other
medium of information.
The spirit of this legislation foretells the future of U.S. public diplomacy.
Due to limited public funding, public diplomacy programs are heavily subject to
government fiscal prejudice. Fiscal hardships caused by the economic crisis since
2008 have led to downsizing public diplomacy. Voice of America was asked to turn
off its Mandarin Chinese broadcasting service; the 63-year-old Advisory
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol5/iss1/7
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Commission on Public Diplomacy was dismissed for 19 months beginning in
December 2011.9 Due to the institutional preference to the role of private entities in
public diplomacy, the U.S. government has retreated from the major sponsor to
major initiator, and a large portion of public diplomacy effort has been relayed to
the private sector. Hence, the inaction of VOA is not only because of the shortage
of funding, but also because of the fact that the dominance of U.S. private media
groups, such as CNN and The New York Times, over the international media sphere
makes state-run media unnecessary.
Therefore, if institutional differences are not considered, a mere superficial
comparison between government-sponsored public diplomacy programs by China
and the U.S. is invalid. On the one hand, although the Chinese government can
afford proliferation and upgrade of public diplomacy programs, close affiliation
with the Chinese government makes many programs seem politically charged and
ideologically sensitive in the American people‘s view. This negates the
accessibility and effectiveness of China‘s public diplomacy in the U.S.
On the other hand, it is not realistic to fit China‘s ―square peg‖ in the U.S.
―round hole.‖ The best universities in China are all public universities, while in the
U.S. the best are private. In China, big media companies are all state-owned, while
in the U.S. big media companies are all private. If the proposals by some U.S.
Senators to equalize U.S.-China public diplomacy, such as requiring a reciprocal
number of journalists stationed by state-run media or reciprocal number of culture
and language institutes funded by government, are implemented, there will be a
sudden die out of China‘s public diplomacy in the U.S., simply because there is no
private sector to back it up. Therefore, China‘s massive push of government-
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sponsored public diplomacy programs in the U.S. is an institutional byproduct
rather than a conspired scheme.
In contrast, although the U.S. government is diffusing and scaling down its
public diplomacy programs, the strong presence of U.S. private cultural and
educational businesses in China, which pursue no obvious public diplomacy
agenda, are contributing to the U.S. public diplomacy automatically. Many
American TV programs have started to reach wider Chinese population due to
growing availability of private TV dishes and the Internet. The Chinese people can
read major newspapers such as The New York Times and the Washington Post
online. Major publishing companies in China synchronize cultural and newsworthy
publications in the U.S. Cultural performances with unique American taste, such as
jazz performances and Broadway musicals are introduced to the Chinese audience
by private performing art agencies. There are hundreds of thousands of Chinese
students learning English language at private American English education institutes
such as the Wall Street Institute School of English and Berlitz in China. All these
enriched and omniscient private businesses have been performing an adequate
public diplomacy function objectively and making the U.S. government-sponsored
programs such as VOA, Information Resource Center, Educational Advising, and
Cultural Exchange less and less relevant and more and more symbolic. To some
extent, a waning government role in U.S. public diplomacy is an institutional and
economical choice rather than a political nonfeasance.

Policy Misconception
Public diplomacy often becomes null in front of incommensurable
foreign/domestic policy. In the U.S. case, inefficiency of its public diplomacy
https://surface.syr.edu/exchange/vol5/iss1/7
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towards China originates from an incoherent China policy. In public, U.S. officials
have insisted for years that they do not have a policy to contain China. On January
14, 2011, former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said: ―A thriving America is
good for China, and a thriving China is good for America. And U.S. friends and
allies in the Asia-Pacific want to move beyond outdated, zero-sum formulas that
might force them to choose between relations with Beijing and relations with
Washington (Clinton, 2011).‖ However, on November 16, 2011, during ChinaPhilippines disputes over South China Sea, Secretary Clinton announced: ―the
United States will always be in the corner of the Philippines and we will stand and
fight with you (Tandon, 2011).‖ Her announcement was accompanied with the
declaration of the U.S.-Australia agreement to deploy 2,500 Marines in Australia to
strengthen alliances in Asia, a move that was seen as a signal to balance the
growing influence of China in the Southeast Asia region. This is just one of many
cases in which the U.S. government‘s deeds belie its words. Public diplomacy as an
integral part of the overall diplomacy cannot stand on itself. If U.S.-China policy is
antagonistic in general, its public diplomacy, no matter how friendly it seems to be,
will be seen as an expediential distraction.
For China, inefficiency of its public diplomacy is caused by its domestic
policy rather than its U.S. policy. Joseph Nye (2012) pertinently pointed out:
What China seems not to appreciate is that using culture and narrative to create
soft power is not easy when they are inconsistent with domestic realities…The
2008 Olympics were a success, but shortly afterwards, China‘s domestic
crackdown in Tibet and Xianjiang, and on human rights activists, undercut its
soft power gains. The Shanghai Expo was also a great success, but was
followed by the jailing of the Nobel peace laureate Liu Xiaobo and the artist Ai
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Weiwei. And for all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television
into competitors for CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for
brittle propaganda. Now, in the aftermath of the Middle East revolutions, China
is clamping down on the Internet and jailing human rights lawyers, once again
torpedoing its soft power campaign.
To sum up, it is the Chinese government‘s domestic policy, which is heterogenic to
the U.S. democratic values, that discredits the Chinese government and makes its
public diplomacy measures in the U.S. unwelcomed and distrusted. The Chinese
government has to be seen as a legitimate and righteous government in the eyes of
the U.S. public before any substantial public diplomacy program can further its
influence; otherwise, China‘s public diplomacy that aims to project a balanced
image on China will be seen as an attempt to make believe.
From a broader viewpoint, inefficiency of U.S.-China public diplomacy is a
curse of the dilemmatic bilateral relations. The U.S.-China relationship is the most
important bilateral relationship in the world. Public diplomacy aiming at creating a
solid basis of mutual understanding between the peoples and minimizing strategic
misinterpretation is essential for the healthy development of U.S.-China relations
and the security of the world. However, the importance of this bilateral relationship
is based more upon strategic deterrence rather than on strategic alliance; and the
relationship is charged with ideological dichotomy and political sensitivity.
Therefore, public diplomacy has always been marginalized and overwhelmed by
strategic planning on hot-button issues, such as arms sales, territorial disputes and
national security.
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Summary
Generally speaking, three common mistakes are usually made unconsciously in
comparing U.S.-China public diplomacy. 1) Confusing public diplomacy with
another form of political communication: propaganda. This mistake is due to
incoherent and confused theoretical and ideological approaches to public
diplomacy. 2) Overstressing the role played by the government. The reason for this
mistake is the institutional compatibility of public diplomacy, which is defined as a
government-sponsored diplomatic practice, with the political institution of big
government. 3) Overestimating applicability of public diplomacy. This mistake is
made if the relations between public diplomacy and overall domestic or foreign
policy are overlooked. Being mindful of the theoretical, institutional and policy
misconceptions behind these mistakes can help public diplomacy scholars and
practitioners evaluate public diplomacy in a more qualitative and comprehensive
way.
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